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The term "securities scam" refers to a diversion of funds to the 
tune of over Rs.  3500 crores from the banking system to various 
stockbrokers in a series of transactions (primarily in Government 
securities) during the period April 1991 to May 1992.  The scam has 
for several months become a permanent feature of the front pages of 
the newspapers.  Despite the massive media coverage of the scam, 
most readers found it hard to understand it particularly when they 
were confronted with arcane terms and acronyms like ready forward, 
double ready forward, SGL, PDO, BR, PMS etc.  Nevertheless an 
understanding of the scam is a prerequisite for any meaningful 
analysis of policy alternatives to improve the functioning of the 
financial system.   
 
This paper presents a plausible reconstruction of how the scam 
originated, how it was perpetrated, and what would be its aftermath. 
 The paper is expository in nature and the authors make no claims to 
omniscience. 
 
The paper goes on to discuss the response of the government to the 
scam in terms of 1) discovering and punishing the guilty,  2) 
recovering the money, and  3) reforming the system.  While agreeing 
with the importance of discovering and punishing the guilty, the 
paper argues that the attempt of the government to recover the money 
by such measures as the tainted shares law which cause severe and 
unjustified hardship to genuine and innocent investors is misguided. 
  
 
Turning to the arena of reforms of the financial system, the paper 
argues that the origins of the scam lie in overregulation of our 
markets.  It recommends that normal transactions must be allowed to 
be done openly and transparently, and the role of brokers as market 
makers must be recognized.  The second lesson from the scam is that 
artificial insulation of closely related markets from each other is 
counterproductive in the long run. Artificial barriers between the 
money market and the capital market, between the market for 
corporate securities and the market for government securities and 
between the formal money market and the informal one must be 
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In April 1992, the first press report appeared indicating that there 
was a shortfall in the Government Securities held by the State Bank 
of India.  In a little over a month, investigations revealed that 
this was the just the tip of the iceberg: what came to be called the 
securities scam involved diversion of funds to the tune of over 
Rs.  3500 crores (well over $ 1 billion) and covered almost all 
aspects of the functioning of the money market. 
 
The scam became a permanent feature of the front pages of the 
newspapers with parallel investigations by the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee (JPC) unearthing new aspects of the scam 
intermittently.   
 
The government responded to the scam with a new law which set up a 
special court to try those accused in the scam.  The new law also 
attached the property of the accused and voided all transactions 
done by them over the past year.  These harsh and extraordinary 
measures created a panic in the stock markets.  The scam also had an 
impact on the liberalization policies being pursued by the 
government with several reform measures being put on hold.   
 
Despite the massive media coverage of the scam, most readers found 
it hard to understand it particularly when they were confronted with 
arcane terms and acronyms like ready forward, double ready forward, 
SGL, PDO, BR, PMS etc.  Nevertheless an understanding of the scam is 
a prerequisite for any meaningful analysis of policy alternatives to 
improve the functioning of the financial system.   
 
This paper presents a plausible reconstruction of how the scam 
originated, how it was perpetrated, and what would be its aftermath. 
 The paper is expository in nature and is based on our analysis of 
the available published data as well as discussions with some 
participants in the securities markets.  We make no claims to 
omniscience. 
 
The paper then goes on to discuss the government's response to the 
scam and analyse the policy initiatives required.   
 
The Two Securities Markets 
 
The scam was in essence a diversion of funds from the banking system 




the brokers for financing their operations in the stock market.  The 
key to understanding the scam is therefore a clear understanding of 
these two markets: the government securities market and the stock 
(corporate securities) markets.  We present below a comparison of 




Characteristic    Government Securities       Stock 
                 Market                Market 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-── 
 
Securities *Government  Securities 
*PSU (Public Sector 
Undertakings) Bonds  
*Units of the Unit Trust 
of India 
Corporate Securities 





Rs.  3000 - 4000 crores 
(over $ 1 billion) a day 











About a dozen brokers 
approved by the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) 
About 500 brokers in the 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
 
Finance  Money Market ("Formal" 
market) 
Badla Finance Market 








The crucial part of the comparison is the last element which 
indicates that the cost of finance in the informal money market 
which finance stock market operations is about twice that of the 
formal market in which banks lend to each other against government 
securities.  Needless to say, restrictions of various kinds kept the 
two markets insulated from each other allowing this massive 
differential to persist. It is also quite clear that there were 
enormous profits to be had for anybody who could find a way of 
breaching the artificial wall separating the two markets and 
arbitrage between them.  That in essence was what the scam was all 
about.  But before we turn to that, it is necessary to take a look 
at the changes in the economic environment during the period of the 
scam.  It is especially important to understand how these changes 
were affecting the principal players in both markets. 
 
The government was, at the time, engaged in a process of economic 




Fund.  These changes promised unprecedented growth and prosperity 
for the private corporate sector as new sectors of the economy were 
thrown open to them and various administrative impediments were 
removed.  In response to this, the stock market boomed - the Bombay 
Stock Exchange Sensitive Index (Sensex) rose from around 1000 in 
February 1991 to a peak of 4500 in March 1992 just before the scam 
came to light. This meant an enormous increase in the scale of 
finance required for those who wanted to operate in the stock 
market.  Restrictions by the Bombay Stock Exchange on margin trading 
added to this funds requirement. 
 
At the same time, the new free market philosophy confronted the 
public sector with new challenges.  There was a tremendous pressure 
on the public sector to perform - to perform in financial terms.   
The nationalized banks were also under the same pressure to improve 
their bottom line.  The proposed increase in capital adequacy 
requirement (mandated by the Narasimham Committee report) added to 
this pressure.   
 
Another innovation in the banking sector in the period preceding the 
scam was the Portfolio Management Scheme (PMS).  Under this scheme, 
banks could accept money from their clients to be invested on their 
behalf in the money market or the stock market.  In theory, the 
clients were to get the actual return earned on these funds.  In 
practice, however, PMS became simply a deposit which was not subject 
to interest rate ceilings or to reserve requirements.  This 
situation arose because several public sector undertakings (PSUs) 
particularly in the oil sector had large amounts of surplus cash 
with them and there was an intense competition among the banks for 
these funds.  (Some of these PSUs were encouraged to borrow in 
international markets to bolster the country's precarious foreign 
exchange reserves.  Since they had no immediate need for these 
funds, they ended up with large cash surpluses, and since they were 
paying interest on these loans, they were eager to earn a decent 
return on them.) 
 
Banks were thus forced to look for higher returns both to improve 
their own profitability and to compete for PMS funds from the PSUs. 
 This was happening at the same time when there was a growing need 
for funds in the informal money market to finance stock market 
operations at very high rates of interest.  The time was ripe for 
somebody to find innovative means of diverting the banks' funds to 
the stock market.  Brokers who were operating in both markets were 
ideally placed to do this, and thus the scam was born. 
 
The Ready Forward Deal 
 
The crucial mechanism through which the scam was effected was the 
ready forward (RF) deal.  The RF is in essence a secured short term 
(typically 15 day) loan from a bank to another bank.  Crudely put, 
the bank lends against government securities just as a pawnbroker 
lends against jewellery.   
 
In form, however, the RF is not a loan at all.  The borrowing bank 




at the end of the period of the loan at (typically) a slightly 
higher price.  The price difference represents the interest on the 
loan. 
 
The RF is what in other countries is known as repo or repurchase 
agreement.  It is a very safe and secure form of lending and is very 
common throughout the world.  The US repo market, for example, is 
about a hundred times larger than the Indian RF market. 
 
The RF in India serves two main purposes: 
 
*    Like repo markets around the world they provide much needed 
liquidity to the government securities markets. 
 
*    They are an important tool in the hands of the banks to 
manage their Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) requirements.   
Banks in India were required to maintain 38.5% (now being 
reduced to 30%) of their demand and time liabilities (DTL) in 
government securities and certain approved securities which 
are collectively known as SLR securities.  RF helps in 
managing this requirement in two ways: 
 
*    A bank which has a temporary surge in DTL may not want to buy 
SLR securities outright and then sell them when the DTL comes 
back to normal.  Instead it can do a RF deal whereby it 
effectively borrows the securities from a bank which has 
surplus SLR securities.  An RF in SLR securities can thus be 
seen either as lending of money or as borrowing of 
securities. 
 
*    An RF deal is not legally a loan.  A bank which borrows under 
RF does not have to treat it as a part of its liabilities at 
all.  Since it is not a part of its DTL, it does not need to 
maintain an SLR in respect of this borrowing.  If the bank 
makes an outright borrowing, it would have to maintain 38.5% 
of it in SLR securities. 
 
In India, the RBI allowed banks to do RFs only in government 
securities and not in PSU bonds or units.  As far as companies and 
individuals were concerned, the RBI's prohibitions did not apply.   
However, some provisions of the Securities Contract Regulation Act 
(1956) particularly sections 13, 16 and 20, prohibited forward 
contracts and options other than the settlement trading allowed in 
the stock exchanges.  Legal opinion has been that this ban does not 
apply to securities which are not listed in the stock exchanges.   
Since units and most PSU bonds are not listed, companies and 
individuals could do RFs in these instruments. 
 
The Mechanics of the Scam 
 
As has been said, the RF is, in substance, a secured loan to a bank. 
To make the scam possible, the RF had to be undergo a complete 
metamorphosis: it had to become an unsecured loan to a broker.  How 





There were three crucial steps in this transformation: 
 
*    The settlement process in the government securities markets 
had to become broker intermediated: delivery and payments had 
to be routed through the broker instead of being made 
directly between the transacting banks. 
 
*    The broker through whom the payment  passes on its way from 
one bank to another had to find a way of crediting this money 
into his account though the account payee cheque was drawn in 
favour of a bank.  
 
*    While the above two steps would transform the RF from a loan 
to a bank into a loan to a broker, it would still be  a 
secured loan.  The broker had to find a way of persuading the 
lending bank to dispense with security or to accept worthless 
security. 
 
We shall now examine each of these steps in turn to understand the 




The normal settlement process in government securities is that the 
transacting banks make payments and deliver the securities directly 
to each other.  The broker;s only function is to bring the buyer and 
seller together and help them negotiate the terms.  He does not 
handle cash or securities.  In this respect, the broker functions 
like the broker in the inter bank foreign exchange market.  Closer 
to ordinary life, this is how the real estate broker also operates: 
he does not handle the money or the title deeds which are exchanged 
directly between buyer and seller. 
 
During the scam, however, the banks or at least some banks adopted 
the alternative settlement process of making delivery and payment 
through the broker.  That is to say, the seller hands over the 
securities to the broker who passes them on to the buyer.   
Similarly, the buyer gives the cheque to the broker who then hands 
it over to the seller.  This settlement process is similar to what 
obtains in the stock market where in fact the buyer and the seller 
may not even know whom they have traded with: both know only the 
broker. 
 
There were two important reasons why the broker intermediated 
settlement began to be used in the government securities markets: 
 
*    The brokers instead of merely bringing buyers and sellers 
together started taking positions in the market.  In other 
words, they started trading on their own account, and in a 
sense became market makers in some securities.  Brokers 
taking positions has its advantages: it adds liquidity to the 
market.  But the fact that brokers were doing so was not 
openly recognized, and brokers adopted the subterfuge of 
pretending to act on behalf of a bank.  Some banks allowed 




which is actually on the broker's personal account is routed 
through the bank. 
 
*    When a bank wanted to conceal the fact that it is doing an 
RF, the broker came in handy.  The second leg of the RF would 
be made out to be with a different bank so that at first 
glance it does not appear as if a RF has been done.  On 
paper, it appears as if an independent purchase and an 
independent sale transaction have been dome with two 
different parties.  The broker provided contract notes for 
this purpose with fictitious counterparties, but arranged for 
the actual settlement to take place with the correct 
counterparty. 
 
Account Payee Cheques 
 
Broker intermediated settlements allowed the broker to lay his hands 
on the cheque as it went from one bank to another.  The problem was 
now to credit it to his account though it was drawn in favour of the 
bank and was crossed account payee. 
 
The account payee crossing is purely a matter of banking custom.  As 
a matter of custom banks pay these cheques only to the payee 
mentioned on the cheque, but there is nothing in the Negotiable 
Instruments Act which mandates this practice.  As a matter of 
banking custom, exceptions were being made to this practice long 
before the scam.  Privileged (corporate) customers were routinely 
allowed to credit account payee cheques in favour of the bank into 
their own account.  Why was this done? 
 
The emergence of this exception to normal practice can be attributed 
to clearing delays.  Normally, if a customer obtains a cheque in his 
own favour and deposits it into his own account, it may take a day 
or two for the cheque to be cleared and for the funds to become 
available to the customer.  On large amounts, the interest loss 
implicit in this clearing delay is substantial.  At 15% interest, 
the interest loss on a clearing delay of two days for a Rs.  100 
crore cheque is Rs. 8 lacs. Obviously, customers were on the lookout 
for ways of eliminating this clearing delay. 
 
The route which was available was the cheque drawn by a bank on its 
account with the RBI.  The RBI acts as the bankers' banker, and 
banks make payments to each other by writing cheques on their 
account with the RBI.  These cheques are cleared on the same day:  
RBI, after all, has only a few customers' accounts to maintain.  The 
practice which thus emerged was that a customer would obtain a 
cheque drawn on the RBI favouring not the customer himself but his 
bank.  The bank would get the money the same day and credit its 
customer.  This was the practice which the brokers in the money 
market exploited to their benefit. 
 
Normally in this system, the issuing bank writes a covering letter 
to the payee bank instructing the latter to credit the account of 
the customer.  In the case of the brokers during the scam, this 




brokers were taking positions on their own account, it was but 
natural that they would receive payments on their own account, and 
the banks asked no questions about the enormous sums that were 
credited and debited into the brokers' personal accounts. 
 
Dispensing with the Security 
 
The broker having found a way of getting hold of the cheque as it 
went from one bank to another and crediting it to his account 
effectively transformed the RF into a loan to himself rather than to 
a bank.  But this, by itself, would not have led to the scam for the 
RF is a secured loan, and a secured loan to a broker is still 
secured.  What was necessary was to find a way of eliminating the 
security. 
 
Three routes were adopted for this purpose: 
 
*    Some banks (or rather their officials) were persuaded to part 
with the cheque without actually getting the securities in 
return.  The simplest explanation of this is that the 
officials concerned were bribed and/or negligent.  The more 
intriguing possibility is that the banks' senior/top 
management were aware of this and turned a blind eye to it.  
One must recognize that as long as the scam lasted, the banks 
also benefited from it in the form of the higher returns that 
the brokers could offer for funds diverted to the stock 
market.  A bank might have been sorely tempted to adopt this 
route to higher profitability.  This method accounted for 
slightly less than half of the total amount of the scam. 
 
*    The second route was to replace the actual securities by a 
worthless piece of paper - the fake Bank Receipt (BR). This 
method accounted for a little more than half of the total 
amount of the scam.  This is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
 
*   The third method was simply to forge the securities 
themselves. In many cases, PSU bonds were represented by 
allotment letters rather than certificates on security paper. 
It was probably easier to forge an allotment letter for 
Rs.  100 crores than it was to forge a 100 rupee note.   
However, outright forgery accounted for only a very small 




More than half of the amount involved in the scam was obtained from 
the banks against worthless (fake) Bank Receipts (BRs).  In an RF 
deal, as we have discussed it so far, the borrowing bank delivers 
the actual securities to the lender and takes them back on repayment 
of the loan.  In practice, however, this is not usually done.   
Instead the borrower gives a BR which serves three functions: 
 





*    It acts as a receipt for the money received by the selling 
bank.  Hence the name - bank receipt. 
 
*    It promises to deliver the securities to the buyer.  It also 
states that in the meantime the seller holds the securities 
in trust for the buyer. 
 
In short, the BR is something like an IOU (I owe you securities!), 
and the use of the BR makes the RF an unsecured loan in fact.  The 
lending bank no longer has the securities; it has only the 
borrower's assurance that it has the securities and will deliver 
them when the need arises. 
 
Advantages of using BRs 
 
There were several reasons why BRs came to be used in lieu of the 
actual securities: 
 
*    BRs were very convenient for RFs because delivery need never 
be made.  BRs can be simply cancelled and returned when the 
RF is reversed. 
 
*    In case of PSU bonds, actual delivery was very difficult for 
a variety of reasons: 
 
*    The volume of scrips to be delivered is very large when RFs 
are made for hundreds of crores. 
 
*    In a number of cases, the PSUs had not issued the bond 
certificates for long periods, and the holding of these PSUs 
was evidence only by an allotment letter. 
 
*    Sometimes, the bond certificate was issued in very large 
denomination (often one certificate for the entire holding) 
and delivery was very difficult when an RF was done for a 
part of this holding. 
 
*   The process of transferring PSU bonds was quite time 
consuming. 
 
*    In case of government securities, the RBI had issued a 
directive that BRs should not be used.  The reason was that, 
for these securities, the RBI, through its Public Debt Office 
(PDO), acted as the custodian.  Physical securities are never 
issued, and the holding of these securities is represented by 
book entries in the PDO.  The ledger in which the PDO 
maintains these accounts is called the Subsidiary General 
Ledger (SGL), and these securities are referred to as SGL 
securities.  When a holder of these securities sells them and 
wishes to transfer them to the buyer, he fills up a SGL 
transfer form and gives it to the buyer.  This SGL form can 
be compared to a cheque: the buyer deposits it into his SGL 
account at the PDO, and the PDO makes a book entry reducing 





    Because of this facility, the RBI thought that BRs are not 
needed in these securities.  If the PDO functioned 
efficiently and carried out its bookkeeping in a timely 
manner, this would have been quite a correct assumption to 
make.  Unfortunately, the PDO was very inefficient and 
laggardly in its functioning.  This was a very serious matter 
because, like a cheque, an SGL form can also bounce if the 
seller does not have sufficient holding of securities in his 
SGL account.  The buyer needs to be informed about this 
promptly; else, he may resell he securities by issuing his 
own SGL forms in the belief that he has sufficient balance in 
his account.  The inefficiency of the PDO made the SGL form 
an inconvenient and unreliable instrument, and banks 
preferred to use BRs for the SGL securities also in violation 
of the RBI's directive. 
 
IBA's Bank Receipt Rules 
 
The Indian Banks Association (IBA) formulated a set of rules to 
regulate the use of BRs.  The principal rules wee as follows: 
 
*    BRs must be issued only in the prescribed form, must be on 
security paper, and must be serially numbered. 
 
*   BR  is  non-transferable. 
 
*   BR must be signed by two authorized signatories whose 
signatures should be registered with the buying bank to 
verify the signatures. 
 
None of these rules were seriously adhered to. 
 
BRs Issued without Backing 
 
As stated earlier, the BR is supposed to imply that the issuer 
actually has the securities and holds them in trust for the buyer.  
But in reality the issuer may not have the securities at all.  There 
are two reasons why a bank may issue a BR which is not backed by 
actual securities: 
 
*    The bank may want to shortsell the securities.  In other 
words, the bank thinking that the securities are going to 
fall in value sells securities which it does not have.  It 
does an outright sale (not an RF!) and instead of delivering 
the actual securities, issues a BR.  When the securities fall 
in value, the bank buys them at the low price and discharges 
the BR by delivering these securities.  Short selling in some 
form or other is an integral part of most bond markets in the 
world.  It can be argued that some amount of shortselling 
subject to some degree of regulation is a desirable feature 
of a bond market.  In India, the only way to shortsell was to 
issue a BR without the backing of the securities.  In our 
opinion, an outright sale using a BR which is not backed by 






*    The second reason is that the bank may simply want an 
unsecured loan.  It may then do an RF deal issuing a BR 
without any securities to back them. The lending bank would 
be under the mistaken impression that it is making a secured 
loan when it is making a totally unsecured loan.  This kind 
of a BR which has no backing is referred to as a fake BR; it 
is quite clear that an RF borrowing on the basis of a fake BR 
is nothing short of cheating.   
 
    In a situation where most RF deals were being done using BRs, 
any lending bank should have known that it may be taken for a 
ride by a borrower issuing a fake BR.   Obviously, lenders 
should have taken care to protect themselves from such a 
possibility.  This aspect will be examined later when we 
discuss the banks' control system in general and counterparty 
limits in particular. 
 
During the scam, the brokers perfected the art of using fake BRs to 
obtain unsecured loans from the banking system.  They persuaded some 
small and little known banks - the Bank of Karad (BOK) and the 
Metropolitan Cooperative Bank (MCB) - to issue BRs as and when 
required.  These BRs could then be used to do RF deals with other 
banks.  The cheques in favour of BOK were, of course, credited into 
the brokers' account.  In effect, several large banks made huge 
unsecured loans to the BOK/MCB which in turn made the money 
available to the brokers. 
 
Magnitude & Breakup of the Scam 
 
At this stage, it is useful to provide a summary picture of the 
magnitude of the scam and its breakup in terms of banks, brokers and 
modus operandi employed.  The Janakiraman Committee put the total 
exposure of the banking system at Rs. 3542 crores.   
 
Out of this, Rs. 1439 crores was accounted for by Shri Harshad Mehta 
whose modus operandi involved loans without any security.  The 
breakup of this amount is as follows 
 
From National Housing Bank 
via State Bank of India (SBI)   708 
via ANZ Grindlays  Bank      506         
via Standard Chartered Bank     55 
via Canfina (under investigation)  2 
             1 2 7 1  
From State Bank of Saurashtra 
via  SBI  and  NHB               175 
 
From SBI Capital Markets Ltd           121 
 
T o t a l              1 5 6 7  
 
 
Most of the remaining amounts represent borrowings from Standard 




(BOK) and the Metropolitan Cooperative Bank (MCB).  A large part of 
this money has been traced to A.D. Narottam's account in the BOK and 
to Shri Hiten Dalal's account in Andhra Bank and it is very likely 
that the rest of the money also ended up in their hands.  These two 
brokers appear to have acted in concert with one of them often 
making payments for purchases made by the other.  The aggregate 
amount involved in this part of the scam appears to be Rs.  1870 
crores: 
 
From Canfina against BOK's BR    435 
From Canbank Mutual fund against   103 
BOK's BR 
From Standard Chartered Bank 
against BOK's BR   356 
against MCB's BR   576      932 
Total amount against fake BRs       1 4 7 0  
 
From Standard Chartered Bank without 
any  security              400 
 
T o t a l                  1 8 7 0  
 
The remaining amount of Rs.  105 crores represents the amount 
borrowed by Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. (FGFSL) from Andhra 
Bank Financial Services Ltd (ABFSL) against forged securities.  (The 
total amount of forged certificates was originally Rs. 206 crores, 
but ABFSL subsequently obtained fresh securities from FGFSL for 
Rs. 101 crores.)   
 
In short, the beneficiaries of the scam were: 
 
Harshad  Mehta       1567 
Narottam/Hiten  Dalal     1870 
Fairgrowth          105 
           - - - -  
Total          3 5 4 2  
           = = = =  
 
The bankwise exposure was: 
 
Standard Chartered Bank      1332 
National Housing Bank       1271 
Canara  Bank  group        538 
State  Bank  group        296 
Andhra  Bank  group        105 
           - - - -  
Total          3 5 4 2  




The scam was made possible by a breakdown both of the control system 





The internal control system within the banks involves several 
features: 
 
*   Separation  of  functions: The idea is that different aspects 
of the securities transactions of the banks are carried out 
by different persons.  Ideally, this means a separation of 
dealing, custody and accounting.  Dealing refers to deciding 
which transactions to enter into with which parties.  Custody 
involves physical custody of the securities as well as 
delivery and payment.  Accounting is responsible for 
maintaining the investment account of the bank and its 
reconciliation with the SGL account of the PDO.   
 
    Closely related to separation of functions is the notion of 
double custody.  Just as the currency chests in the banks are 
under double custody where two people have to join together 
to open it, the custody of securities could be under double 
custody. 
 
    In many banks like the National Housing Bank, these controls 
did not exist.  In others, like the State Bank of India, they 
existed but broke down partially or wholly because of the 
negligence of one or more functionaries. 
 
*   Counterparty  Limits: The moment RFs are done on the basis of 
BRs rather than actual securities, the lending bank must 
worry about the possibility that the BR that it has received 
is not backed by any securities.  In effect, it may be making 
an unsecured loan, and it must do the RF only if it would be 
prepared to make an unsecured loan.  This means assessing the 
creditworthiness of the borrower and assigning him a "credit 
limit" upto which one is prepared to lend.  Technically this 
is known as a counterparty limit.  Strictly, a counterparty 
limit is required even if the RF is done against actual 
securities because the securities may decline in value and 
the RF may end up becoming only partly secured though it was 
fully secured to begin with. 
 
    Most of the foreign banks with the exception of the Standard 
Chartered Bank had very strict counterparty limits and were 
thus protected from lending too much against fake BRs.  For a 
bank like the Bank of Karad, a reasonable counterparty limit 
may be have Rs.  50 lacs  so that an RF for several hundred 
crores would be flatly refused.  The Standard Chartered Bank 
either did not have or did not adhere to such limits and 
agreed to do these RFs. 
 
The control system of the RBI should have involved two things: 
 
*    A reconciliation of the SGL securities claimed by the banks 
in the aggregate with their total holding as revealed by the 
SGL accounts at the PDO.  If all BRs are backed by 
securities, this would tally because a sale through BR would 
reduce the seller's investment account and increase the 





This exercise does not seem to have been attempted at all. 
 
*    Site inspections and other audits of the investment accounts 
of the banks.  These were not quite comprehensive and even 
when some irregularities were detected, they were not taken 
sufficiently seriously. 
 
Other Aspects of the Scam 
 
What we have described above covers the bulk of the scam by 
magnitude.  There are, however, several aspects of the scam which 
are closely related to the activities in the securities markets, but 
whose nature is slightly different.  We discuss these below. 
 
Coupon Changes and Insider Trading 
 
During the period from September 1991 to June 1992, the government 
raised the interest (coupon) rate on its fresh borrowings three 
times; the coupon rate went up from 11.5% to 13% during this period. 
 The natural implication of this rise in interest rates is a fall in 
the market prices of the old loans which are pegged at the old 
interest rate.  This phenomenon can be observed in the price of the 
11.5% Government Loan 2010.  The first coupon hike from 11.5% to 12% 
saw the 2010 decline from 101.20 to 98.20 (RBI selling rate) - a 
fall of almost 3%.  The second coupon hike to 12.5% caused a further 
4.5% fall in price to 93.75.  The third coupon hike to 13% was 
followed by another 3% fall in the market prices. 
 
It is very clear that anybody who cam to know of the coupon change 
beforehand could make an enormous amount of money by shortselling 
the government securities just before the hike and covering his 
position after the prices have fallen.  Somebody who took a short 
position of Rs. 500 crores before the coupon hike of September 1991 
could have made a profit of Rs. 15 crores in a month's time.  Since 
several people in the ministry and the RBI are likely to be aware of 
the impending coupon hike, the chance of leakage of this information 
is always there.   
 
Well before the scam broke out, there were news reports that 
suggested that some such activity might have taken place.  A cover 
story in Business India in February, 1992 quoted Harshad Mehta as 
saying that he withdrew from the market six months earlier (i.e. in 
August 1991) when he realized that the interest rates were going up. 
 He is further quoted as having claimed that he even sold securities 
short to profit from price falls.  Of course, it can be always 
argued that the position was taken on the basis not of inside 
information but of intelligent forecasts and analysis. 
 
In March 1992, the State Bank of India bought a huge amount of 11.5% 
Government Loan 2010 from Harshad Mehta on ready forward basis one 
day before the coupon hike.  In fact, it was in the course of 
investigating this transaction that the whole scam came to light (at 
least that is what the RBI claims).  Of course, a ready forward 




and SBI would get rid of the securities.  But the real objective of 
the transaction could have been to help Harshad Mehta to shortsell 
the securities.  We have already seen that an RF purchase can be 
regarded as borrowing securities.  Effectively, therefore, Harshad 
Mehta may have been borrowing the securities (in the name of the 
State Bank of India) from another bank and selling the borrowed 
securities to a third bank.  Selling borrowed securities is one way 
of doing a shortsale. 
 
However, it will probably be very difficult to prove with any degree 
of certainty that there was insider trading on the basis of coupon 
rate changes.  One reason is the very size of the market.  With a 
daily trading volume of Rs. 3000 - 4000 crores, it would have been 
very easy for anyone to take a position of Rs. 500 or even Rs. 1000 
crores without anybody suspecting anything untoward. 
 
Window Dressing Bank Balance Sheets 
 
Most banks carry investments in their books at their cost of 
acquisition and do not mark it down to market.  This creates serious 
distortions during a period when, as shown in the preceding section, 
the prices of securities are falling.  If one assumes that prices of 
government securities have fallen by an average of about 5% over the 
last year, then on an aggregate holding of these securities by the 
banking system of Rs.  70,000 crores, the paper loss would be 
Rs. 3,500 crores.  A 10% fall in the prices of PSU bonds would imply 
a further paper loss of a several hundred crores.  Under the current 
system of accounting, these losses have to be recognized only when 
the securities are sold.   
 
This means that a bank would be reluctant to sell these securities 
and how the loss in its books.  It was in this context that the 
banks and the brokers resorted to various methods of window dressing 
the bank balance sheet.  The basic idea is that: 
 
a)   The bank sells the securities to a broker at face value or at 
cost though they are worth much less in the market.  The 
broker absorbs a huge loss in this transaction as he will 
have to resell the securities to some other bank at market 
prices. 
 
b)   The bank buys some other securities from the broker at prices 
well above market prices.  The broker makes a huge profit 
which compensates him for the loss which he sustained in 
transaction (a). 
 
The key idea is that the loss that the bank makes in transaction (b) 
is not reflected in its profit and loss account at all.  The 
securities simply appear in its balance sheet at an inflated value. 
 
This idea can also be extended not merely to avoiding losses but 
also to creating profits.  The transaction in (a) can be done not at 
original cost but at a profit.  As far the broker is concerned, the 
price in transaction (a) can be as high as the bank wants so long as 





What the scam investigations have revealed is that window dressing 
of this kind was rampant.  Instances have been recorded of the same 
broker selling the same security on the same day to different banks 
at vastly different prices.  This makes it very difficult to fathom 
individual transactions in isolation.  Unless one can put together 
the entire series of transactions, it is impossible to know whether 
the banks or the brokers have been the net gainers overall.  It is 
conceivable that some brokers were willing to absorb part of the 
losses as a quid pro quo for other "services" which the banks 
provided them.  
 
It is interesting to note that even the pure RF deal involves an 
element of window dressing.  The lending bank shows the interest 
received as an income in its profit and loss account.  But the 
borrowing bank does not show the interest paid as an expense. ; it 
simply carries the investment in its books at the higher repurchase 
price.   
 
It is, in fact, quite likely that the enormous increases in the 
profits that some of the banks reported in the last year might have 
its origins in such "creative" accounting practices. 
 
Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. (FGFSL) 
 
FGFSL's role in the scam is one of the most difficult to unravel.  
It is necessary to distinguish several facets of FGFSL's 
involvement: 
 
*    During the scam, FGFSL was involved in every aspect of the 
money market.  It was dealing with both the Harshad Mehta 
group and the Hiten Dalal/ Narottam group of brokers.  It was 
also trading heavily in the stock market - its transactions 
in one year amounted to Rs. 10,000 crores (?). As against a 
paid up capital of only Rs. crores, FGFSL had borrowings of 
Rs. crores and made profits of Rs. crores.   
 
*    In the aftermath of the scam, FGFSL found itself under severe 
pressure to repay its debts to various banks.  In the 
depressed conditions, it could not sell its stock market 
investments and honour its commitments.  It was then that 
FGFSL resorted to outright forgery.  Allotment letters of 
units were simply forged and delivered to the banks to whom 
FGFSL had sold the units. 
 
*   Several questions have been raised about the private 
placement of FGFSL shares against the promoters' quota (?).   
The company has not yet made a public issue, but in the grey 
market, the shares were at one time quoting at 30-35 times 
the face value.  In this situation, the investigating 
authorities seem to be acting on the assumption that anybody 
holding shares in FGFSL is linked to the company management 
and is responsible for the malpractices of the company.   




incorrect, the real nature of the links between the company 
and its shareholders is extremely murky. 
 
Call Money Irregularities 
 
Investigations have revealed that certain transactions in which 
banks purportedly lent to other banks in the call market for one or 
two days were in fact diverted to the brokers.  This, however, 
appears to be relatively a small magnitude.  Clearly the extremely 
short duration of the cal market borrowings made them unattractive 
from the brokers' point of view.  
 
Sale of PSU Shares 
 
The government invited bids for purchase of the shares of some PSUs 
in February 1992.  (This was the second instalment of PSU equity 
sale, the first having been done in December 1991).  The offer was 
made to the public sector mutual funds, banks and financial 
institutions, and it was a condition of this sale that the 
institutions could offload the shares only through normal stock 
exchange transactions after the shares have been listed in the stock 
markets.  In the course of the investigations it turned out that in 
some cases the banks acted only as conduits for making the bids: 
there was a prior arrangement to sell the shares to certain brokers. 
  
The existence of such a phenomenon and of clandestine sale of PSU 
shares was well known even before the scam broke out.  The scam 
investigations have only provided detailed evidence for this.  The 
whole episode has only pointed out the utter folly of selling PSU 
shares to banks and financial institutions rather than to the 
general public as was done in the privatization campaign in Britain. 
 
Detection of the Scam 
 
As stated earlier, the RBI claims that the scam was detected in 
pursuance of its investigation of the possibility of insider trading 
in government securities around the coupon hike of March 1992.  The 
RBI asked the State Bank of India (SBI) to give a list of its 
holdings of its securities as on March 31, 1992.  SBI, therefore, 
had to reconcile its investment account with the SGL balances 
reported by the PDO.  For example, in the 11.5% Government Loan 
2010, the SGL balance seemed to be Rs. 1671 crores as against the 
balance of Rs.  1745 crores as per SBI's books.  While trying to 
reconcile this discrepancy of Rs. 74 crores, SBI discovered that the 
SGL balance of Rs. 1671 crores contained an alteration: the original 
figures received from the PDO was Rs. 1171 crores, and it had been 
altered to Rs. 1671 crores.  Suddenly the discrepancy became Rs. 574 
crores.  This represented transactions with Harshad Mehta for which 
neither securities nor BRs had been delivered by SBI.  Finally, it 
turned out that an amount of Rs.  649 crores was due from Harshad 
Mehta.  SBI promptly summoned Mehta and asked him to deliver the 
securities or to pay the money.  Mehta offered to pay the money  and 
between April 13, 1992 and April 24, 1992, paid an aggregate amount 





However, all that Harshad Mehta had done was to "borrow" the money 
from the National Housing Bank (NHB) in the same way that he had 
been borrowing from SBI and NHB earlier.  This left NHB with a total 
exposure of over Rs. 1200 crores representing an earlier exposure of 
over Rs. 700 crores and a fresh exposure of Rs. 500 crores.  NHB, 
backed by the RBI has succeeded in recovering most of the money from 
the banks (SBI and ANZ Grindlays) to whom NHB had issued the cheques 
which the payee banks credited to Harshad Mehta's account. 
 
Where did the money go? 
 
The billion dollar question is where did all the money go?  It is 
difficult to say anything with certainty, but the following appear 
to be the important possibilities: 
 
*    A large amount of the money was invested in shares.  Harshad 
Mehta was known to be a "bull" operator and was continuously 
buying shares. The first question is what are the shares 
worth?  Till February 1992, the Bombay Sensitive Index was 
below 2000; thereafter it rose sharply to peak at 4500.  In 
the aftermath of the scam it fell to about 2500 before 
recovering to around 3000 by August 1992. It is very likely 
that the bulk of Harshad Mehta's purchases were made at low 
prices, so that his average cost of his portfolio corresponds 
to an index well below 2500 or even below 2000. Therefore, 
Mehta's claim that he can clear all his dues if he were 
allowed to do so cannot be dismissed out of hand.  The second 
question is whether all these shares can be traced.  The scam 
ordinance notwithstanding, there is considerable uncertainty 
about this because a share with a blank transfer deed is 
virtually a bearer instrument. 
 
*    Considerable part of the money could have been spent on 
financing the stock markets losses of the Hiten Dalal/ 
Narottam group who were known to be bear operators and were 
suffering heavy losses in March/ April 1992. 
 
*    It is rumoured that part of the money was sent out of India 
through the havala racket, converted into dollars, and 
brought back as India Development Bonds.  These bonds are 
redeemable in dollars and the holder cannot be asked to 
identify the source of his holdings.  Thus this money is 
beyond the reach of any of the investigating agencies. 
 
*    Some part must have been spent as bribes and kickbacks to the 
various accomplices in the banks and possibly in the 
bureaucracy and the political system. 
 
*    As stated earlier, some part might represented losses taken 
by the brokers to window dress the bank's balance sheet.  In 
other words, part of the money that went pout of the banking 











The immediate impact of the scam was a sharp fall in the share 
prices.  The index fell from 4500 to 2500 representing a paper loss 
of Rs. 1.0 lac crores.   
 
The reason for this fall was not probably the withdrawal of the scam 
finance.  On a market capitalization of Rs.  2.5 lac crores, scam 
finance of Rs.  3,500 crores could not have had such a drastic 
impact.  The more likely reason for the sharp fall was the 
government's knee jerk response to the scam in promulgating the 
Special Courts Ordinance with several draconian provisions.   
 
The ordinance attached the property of all the scam accused and also 
voided all transactions undertaken by them over the past one year.  
Since the accused were active brokers in the stock markets, the 
number of shares which had passed through their hands at some time 
within the last one year was colossal. All these shares became 
"tainted" shares, and a genuine investor who had bought these shares 
well before the scam broke out and even got them registered in his 
name found himself being robbed of those shares.  The result was a 
total panic in the stock markets.  The "tainted" shares, more than 





There is a general perception that in the aftermath of the scam, the 
liberalization policies of the government were put on hold.  The 
Stock Exchange Board of India (SEBI) postponed sanctioning of 
private sector mutual funds.  Implementation of some aspects of the 
Narasimham Committee were also probably delayed.  Some question 
marks arose regarding privatization as the chairman of the committee 
looking into this ended up in jail on charges of involvement in the 
scam. 
 
The much talked about entry of foreign pension funds and mutual 
funds became more remote than ever.  The ability of Indian companies 




Policy Responses Required 
 
The response of any government to a scam of this kind would have 
three main facets: 
 
1.   Discover and punish the guilty.  This task has been entrusted 
to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and to the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee (JPC).  A special court has also been 





2.   Recover the money.  The draconian provisions of the Ordinance 
for attachment of property and voiding of transactions with 
the consequent creation of "tainted" shares were attempts in 
this direction. 
 
3.   Reform  the  system.  The government's response so far has 
consisted of measures like banning of RF deals and going slow 
on liberalization. 
 
There cannot be any two opinions about the need for the first 
process of discovering and punishing the guilty.  The principal 
objective behind punishing the offenders is more to deter future 
offenders.  Investigations of this kind are necessarily time 
consuming and expensive, but they have to be gone through so that 
the credibility of the system is restored.  A rule of thumb which is 
often quoted throughout the world is that investigation of any fraud 
will cost as much as the magnitude of the fraud itself.  One can, 
therefore, expect the real costs of the scam investigation to be of 
the order of a couple of thousand crores. 
 
The emphasis placed on the recovery of the money is, in our opinion, 
totally misplaced.  Governments have, at all times, claimed special 
powers to recover its dues like land revenue and taxes.  That 
principle does not and cannot extend to the recovery of amounts 
which the government owned organizations (or for that matter, the 
foreign banks) have lost by their own negligence or complicity.   
There can be no justification for such measures as the "tainted" 
shares law which harass genuine innocent investors in order to 
recover a few hundred crores.   
 
The most constructive response to the scam would be in the arena of 
reforms of the financial system.  In our view, the origins of the 
scam lie in overregulation of our markets.  The regulations in the 
money markets were such that thoroughly legitimate and essential 
transactions could not be put through openly, but had to be 
disguised and camouflaged.  The role of the brokers and of some of 
the banks as market makers was not recognized and they could perform 
these important and useful functions only by subterfuge.  The 
payment and clearance system was so antiquated and cumbersome that 
totally indefensible methods had to be adopted to achieve speedy 
funds transfers.  The net result of all this was a total lack of 
transparency in the operations in the money market.  Irregularities 
of all kinds were so common that no suspicions are aroused even by 
highly irregular transactions.  This is the ideal environment for a 
scam to germinate and grow to alarming proportions.  We would even 
argue that some of the control systems in the banks broke down 
because they had been deliberately allowed to weaken in order to 
facilitate normal transactions in violation of the RBI guidelines. 
 
The second lesson from the scam is that artificial insulation of 
closely related markets from each other is counterproductive in the 
long run.  Just as water finds its own level, money also seeks out 
the highest levels of return after due adjustments fro risk and 
liquidity.  Even after ten years of progressive liberalization of 




market and the capital market, between the market for corporate 
securities and the market for government securities and between the 
formal money market and the informal one.  Integration of these 
markets with the attendant equalization of returns in these markets 
is, in our view, a matter of the highest priority in the agenda for 
financial reforms.  This integration will allow a coherent yield 
curve to emerge covering the entire financial markets. 
 
In this context, the policy responses of the government in the 
direction of further regulation and controls (for example, the ban 
on RFs) would appear to be quite misguided.  The recommendations of 
the Nadkarni Committee that RFs be permitted and that the entire 
settlement and clearing system be streamlined and computerized is to 
be welcomed. 
 